As such, they’re extremely hard to defend against. Zero-days are software vulnerabilities that no one knows about yet. This allows it to catch and report otherwise undetectable malware. Therefore, any anomaly is quickly identified. Because it’s basically just a dummy network, there should be no activity on it at all. That’s because hackers often test their malware against widely used scanners to make sure it will avoid detection before they release it into the wild. Anti-malware scanners don’t always detect new viruses, trojans, and worms. When integrated with other security tools (like IDS/IPS, SIEM, firewalls, and anti-malware), this early warning system can dramatically improve a company’s other security layers by feeding them valuable intel on pending attacks so that each security tool is ready for them. This makes them an effective “early warning system” for a company because they identify active threats before these impact the real network, giving the security team time to prepare. Honeypots are often the first to be attacked, because they look like weak, vulnerable points on a network to an attacker. Honeypots are generally a very low-cost security solution as well, since there are numerous open source tools available.īecause of the way honeypots are designed and how they interact with hackers and malware, they can aid energy companies in several key ways: Its job is basically to act as bait for hackers and malware, luring them into the dummy system in order to detect what threats are targeting the network. Courtesy: Modern Honey NetworkĪ honeypot can be made to look like any number of things that would entice a hacker, including a desktop computer, web application, back-end server, USB thumb drive, or database. This diagram shows the structure of an industrial honeypot network. To the attacker, the honeypot looks like a real computer network that is poorly protected in reality, it’s a fake system that is isolated from the rest of the organization’s network and monitored closely by a security team and automated tools. The most effective way for energy firms to overcome these obstacles and harden their defenses against nation-state threats is by deploying a tool known as the “honeypot.”Ī honeypot is basically just a dummy network node, software application, or computer that exists for the sole purpose of getting hacked (Figure 1). The worm used four software vulnerabilities (then unknown to the world) to target computers, software, and industrial systems. In 2010, Iran’s nuclear program was attacked by the Stuxnet computer worm, which caused physical damage to its machinery. It was also able to avoid detection from various security tools as it spread throughout the network and exfiltrated data. This malware was designed to detect a company’s antivirus settings and change its behavior to avoid detection. In April and May 2012, Iran’s Oil Ministry was infected by the Flame malware, widely believed to be the most advanced malware ever discovered at that time. The company’s anti-malware detection system actually caught the threat early on, but Target’s security team ignored the warnings. In November and December of 2013, Target fell victim to a massive data breach of its point-of-sale systems from the BlackPOS malware. Here are a few examples of how these limitations can undermine a security program: Some of these limitations include: a high rate of false positives, which slow down the security team inability to detect new or custom-made malware trouble blocking internal-based threats and response geared toward threats in the network, rather than before they impact the network. Each of these tools-as well as the human team managing them-has key limitations, which can prove disastrous when combating an advanced and persistent adversary such as a state-sponsored hacking group. Protecting these critical networks from exploitation requires a multi-layered security approach that involves physical controls, a highly trained security team, intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS), anti-malware scanners, firewalls, security information and event management (SIEM), and more.īut the reality is, not even all of that is enough. energy firms, however, is that industrial control systems (ICS) are inherently vulnerable and hard to defend. and Western European energy firms’ industrial control networks with remote access trojans. A recent example of the severity of this threat can be seen in operation “Energetic Bear”-a Russian campaign to infect U.S. energy infrastructure for cyber-espionage and sabotage purposes. Cybersecurity threats facing the power industry have escalated dramatically in the past few years, as state-sponsored, organized crime, and hacktivist groups all seek to infiltrate U.S.
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